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Non-technical Summary
Energy conversion and use are major sources of environmental pollution. Emissions from transport or from burning fossil fuels to produce electricity contribute substantially to global warming and other environmental problems. In line with the economic theory of externalities, several environmental policy measures try to reduce emissions from energy use by influencing the costs of energy consumption. The most important environmental policies in European energy markets are the European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS), energy taxes, subsidies for renewable energy sources, and instruments specifically targeted at the transport sector.
A price increase of energy as an input increases production costs. This reduces the domestic and foreign demand for goods and services and, therefore, creates macroeconomic costs. Our paper presents a survey on selected studies on macroeconomic costs of environmental regulation in European energy markets. As some policy measures are initiated on the national level we also include experiences of single Member States, especially Germany.
The analysed studies show that the environmental regulation affects the European economy, particularly the energy intensive industries and the industries that produce internationally tradable goods. From a macroeconomic point of view, however, the costs appear to be relatively small. The reason for that is that some sectors benefit from the regulation. If, for example, the regulation creates government revenues which are used to lower non-wage labour costs, this may benefit the labour intensive sectors, such as services. Not surprisingly, macroeconomic costs tend to be higher for more ambitious environmental targets. In this case, also the efficiency of the regulation becomes a more important issue. There are numerous studies on the macroeconomic costs of the EU ETS. Here, the costs depend not only on the assignment of reduction obligations to the sectors participating in the EU ETS but also on the optimal allocation of emission permits between the sectors participating in the ETS and the rest of the economy. The macroeconomic costs are lower if the project-based mechanisms, Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, are less restricted and costly domestic emission reduction can be replaced by cheaper reduction abroad. In this case, the resulting GDP losses from implementing the Kyoto targets are typically around 0.4% as compared to business-as-usual (BAU), but lower than emissions reductions without the EU ETS. In the case of energy taxes, particularly the recycling of revenues and tax exemptions influence the amount of macroeconomic costs. Many studies conclude that the use of I revenues for reductions in labour costs and tax exemptions for energy intensive industries can limit GDP losses to well below 0.1% or even lead to slight rises in GDP. The energy taxes analysed typically lead to emission reductions on the order of 2 to 3%. Studies on clean energy policy in the transport sector cover a wide portfolio of instruments from fuel taxes or road charges to efficiency standards. Potential impact on GDP is found to be substantial, up to 1% by 2020, indicating that emission reductions in the transport sector are relatively expensive. Macroeconomic model simulation results for increasing the share of EU 15 renewable electricity production to 30% in 2020 surveyed in this paper range from roughly 0.1 to 1% as compared to BAU.
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Introduction
Energy conversion and use are a major source of environmental pollution. Emissions from burning fossil fuels for transport, to generate electricity or to produce industrial goods substantially contribute to urban ozone and other air pollution, acid deposition, regional haze and visibility problems as well as the build-up of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration in the earth's atmosphere. The consequences are human health problems, damage of ecosystems, crops, and building material, amenity losses, and global warming (cf. European Commission, 2003) . In line with the economic theory of externalities, several environmental policy measures try to reduce emissions related to energy use by inducing incentives to increase energy efficiency and to use clean energy sources. The most important instruments in European energy markets are the European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS), energy taxes, policy measures in the transport sector, and the promotion of renewable energy sources.
All these policy measures typically imply higher energy prices for consumers and often also for producers.
An increase in the price of energy as an input raises production costs. This can reduce the domestic and foreign demand for goods and services and thereby create macroeconomic costs. This paper analyses the macroeconomic costs of environmental regulation in European energy markets. For this purpose, we review the results of selected simulation studies that analyse the macroeconomic effects of environmental regulation. Although environmental regulation creates external benefits, such as avoided damage from climate change or reduced non-GHG air pollution, this paper does not include these benefits but only the internal benefits from the reallocation of resources, such as the profit gain of producers of energy efficient technologies.
In our analysis we focus primarily on policy measures that are implemented or intended at the European level. The baseline in all modelling studies is business-as-usual (BAU). As some policy measures are initiated on the national level we also include experiences of single Member States, particularly Germany. Effects on the sectoral or firm level, e.g. the implication of an energy tax for energy intensive sectors or the household sector, are only addressed casually. However, due to differences in energy intensity and possibilities to substitute energy intensive technologies by more efficient technologies, the costs of environmental regulation can differ substantially between countries, sectors and firms. Higher energy prices reduce the profitability of energy intensive companies, whereas producers of energy efficient technologies may benefit. As the macroeconomic costs subsume all these effects they are usually smaller than the costs in the energy intensive sectors.
Theoretical Background
Energy conversion and consumption (e.g. burning fossil fuels) cause negative external effects in the form of environmental pollution and human health damages which a priori are not taken into account in production and consumption decisions. This leads to a level of emissions from energy consumption above the socially optimal level which considers both private and social costs. The solution to the welfare problem in the economic literature is the internalisation of external effects via a Pigouvian tax, tradeable permits, or other policy instruments. They tend to increase energy prices and try to limit emissions from energy consumption to the socially optimal level (Common and Stagl, 2005) .
The aim of this article is to determine the macroeconomic costs of environmental regulation.
Macroeconomic costs of environmental regulation do not contain external effects, such as ecological or human health damages. Similarly, the avoided damages are not taken into account. In this analysis, we consider only the economic consequences of higher energy prices caused by environmental regulation to quantify what Europe pays for clean energy. What Europe gains from clean energy is a question in its own right and beyond the purpose of our contribution. Nor are distributional issues of environmental regulation -e.g. the redistributive role of green taxation -taken into account.
According to the standard theory of optimal taxation, taxes levied on commodities generally create distortionary effects in form of deadweight losses (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980) . Hence, energy taxes or other policy measures that increase energy prices generally create inefficiencies. The distortionary effect of a tax decreases with the elasticity of demand. It is zero if the demand is perfectly inelastic. The demand elasticity of electricity, for instance, is typically relatively small. The deadweight loss of electricity taxes, therefore, is expected to be small as well. Taxes on goods with an inelastic demand, such as electricity, can even have positive economic impacts if they replace more distortionary taxes on goods with higher elasticity of demand. This effect is called Double Dividend and it is extensively discussed in the economic literature.
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There are a number of policy instruments that are targeted at changing the costs of energy consumption and therefore at influencing the incentives of producers and consumers. They include energy taxes, tradeable permits, emissions abatement subsidies, and efficiency standards. As these instruments have different requirements in terms of information of the regulator, the effectiveness and efficiency can differ substantially on the microeconomic level (Perman et al., 2003) . From a deterministic macroeconomic viewpoint, however, their economic impact depends essentially on the financial burden they put on input and output factors in equilibrium irrespective of the specific policy instrument used to levy the burden.
In relation to labour and capital costs, energy prices are not very important for most firms and rarely a cause for relocation. Nevertheless, higher energy prices increase production costs.
Thus, if companies face international competition and have only limited possibilities to reduce their energy consumption, unilaterally increasing energy prices reduce the profitability and competitiveness of these firms.
It is sometimes argued that higher electricity prices can also have positive impacts if they lead to the development and implementation of new energy efficient technologies. This effect is commonly known as the Porter Hypothesis. It states that stringent environmental regulations can in principal increase the competitiveness of firms, sectors and economies because they trigger environmentally benign innovations which may reduce production costs or create other competitive advantages. In addition, follower countries that also introduce ambitious environmental regulation may buy these new technologies (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Porter 1999) .
2 To our knowledge, simulation studies have not yet quantified the macroeconomic impacts of this effect.
Results of Selected Simulation Studies
Selection of Simulation Studies
Our literature review is based on macroeconomic simulation studies that calculate the change of macroeconomic variables, such as GDP or welfare, caused by the introduction of certain environmental policy measures. The focus is on simulation studies using computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and macroeconometric models. Both types of models are able to quantify the economy-wide impacts and effects in secondary markets in the framework of a single-market or multi-market analysis. CGE models calculate a vector of prices such that all markets of the economy are in equilibrium. All demand and supply equations are derived from microeconomic principles. Originally, CGE models assumed only competitive markets; meanwhile, later versions sometimes also include market imperfections. Based on economic theory they show a high level of theoretical coherence. Parameters and coefficients of the assumed functional forms are typically calibrated to match a base year dataset.
Macroeconometric models, in contrast, are structural empirical models and are developed fully based on coherent datasets. In particular, equations may not be derived from a microeconomic foundation of the economic relation they describe. The parameters of the equations are estimated with econometric methods.
The baseline scenario which serves as benchmark in all simulation studies is business-asusual (BAU). It denotes the hypothetical scenario where the policy measure was never introduced. The macroeconomic costs of environmental regulation can therefore be interpreted as price for the improvement of environmental quality that comes along with the implementation of the instrument. Note that reaching a given environmental target may be more or less costly depending on the instrument and the regulatory design. It is the goal of economic instruments in environmental policy to efficiently reach environmental targets.
Simulation models sometimes assume compliance with certain environmental targets in both the baseline scenario and the policy scenario. In these cases the baseline often represents the cost efficient way to achieve the targets. Thus, the differences between policy scenario and baseline scenario can be interpreted as price for choosing a policy different from the cost efficient policy. Such simulation studies are not the focus of this paper. Hence, our review also includes costs that will have to be paid in the future in order to reach existing environmental objectives.
European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS)
The EU ETS was launched at the beginning of 2005 to control the CO 2 emissions of the carbon intensive industry, mostly power generation and heavy industry. The aim of the EU ETS is to ensure emissions reduction at least costs. The cap-and-trade mechanism allows emissions reduction to meet the overall reduction target where and how it is cheapest to do so and without technical knowledge of the regulator. The initial allocation of emission allowances is decided by the Member States. Although they are required to be on the pathway to their Kyoto targets and the EU Burden Sharing Agreement, they have discretion over what share of their overall emissions reduction they plan to achieve in the EU ETS sectors that participate in the trading scheme, and how much they plan to abate in the sectors that do not participate (non-ETS sectors). The optimal split between the ETS sectors and the non-ETS sectors equals the marginal abatement costs in both sectors. Böhringer and Lange (2005a) show that the objectives of economic efficiency and free allocation of emission permits are incompatible with harmonized allocation rules which are often called for in order to avoid distorting the competition. For the actual allocation of the first phase, Böhringer et al. (2005) show that the Member States have failed to implement the optimal split in the first trading burden of different dynamic allocation rules. They find that -especially for high CO 2 prices -an emission-based free allocation is more costly than an output-based free allocation. Welfare losses tend to be lower than 0.15% for permit prices around 30$US per ton of CO 2 .
Oberndorfer and Rennings (2007) review the results of various simulation studies, including CGE models, partial models, and macroeconometric models, in order to assess the competitiveness effects of the EU ETS. They find small negative effects on the sectoral and the macroeconomic level, if the baseline is BAU. The losses in most sectors are modest except for the aluminium sector with its particular competitive situation, very limited options to reduce electricity consumption, and whose profits highly depend on electricity prices.
COWI (2004) for the second trading period shows that the welfare loss would be considerably greater if more of the reduction burden were shifted from the ETS to the non-ETS sector.
Energy Taxes
Most EU Member States have implemented energy taxes on electricity, motor fuels and heating fuels. However, the level of taxation differs substantially. The new Member States and some southern countries of the EU15, such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain have low tax rates whereas Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden have relatively high tax rates.
In order to avoid distortion of competition, most Member States, especially those with relatively high tax levels, offer tax exemptions or rebates for the energy intensive industry as well as recycling of tax revenues, e.g. through cutting other taxes.
The National Level
As from 1 April 1999 the German environmental tax reform entered into force. It introduced a tax on electricity and raised the existing taxes on motor fuels and heating fuels. The tax rates were gradually increased each year until 2003. The aim of the tax reform is on the one hand to reduce energy consumption and the resulting emissions. On the other hand, as tax revenues are used for the most part to reduce pension insurance contributions for employers and employees, it is hoped that the tax reform increases employment. The reform contains special provisions for the business sector to prevent a distortion of competition. The manufacturing sector and agriculture pay a reduced tax rate of 60% of the regular tax rate. Additionally, where a manufacturing company's tax burden is greater than its tax relief from the reduction in pension contribution, the company is refunded 95% of the differential amount. As a result, the de facto marginal tax rate is 3% (5% of 60%). Kohlhaas (2005) Change Levy leads to a slight deterioration of the trade performance because the net effect of the tax reform is to slightly raise the costs for those industries producing tradable goods.
The European Level
On Koschel (2001) demonstrates that within the framework of CGE models it typically depends on a number of model assumptions -such as substitution patterns in production, the foreign trade specification or the labour market specification -whether employment will increase or not in response to an ecological tax reform. For testing the sensitivity of model results she uses two versions of the GEM-E3 model: the single-country version for Germany and the multi-country EU-14 version. In the standard versions of both models with a neoclassical labour market a (unilaterally in Germany or rather EU-widely imposed) revenue-neutral CO 2 tax leads to higher employment, while CO 2 emissions are reduced by 10%. These positive impacts on employment can be explained by tax shifting effects from labour to the foreign sector and towards capital income. In addition, Koschel (2001) shows that the introduction of labour market imperfections enlarges the opportunity for an employment double dividend. Kouvaritakis et al. (2003) also use the CGE modelling framework GEM-E3 to analyse the impacts of three different energy tax schemes in the EU15. The tax schemes apply to final energy demand including coal, oil, gas, and electricity. As the demand for motor fuels is not a separate category in an Input-output framework, the implementation of the tax on motor fuels in GEM-E3 remains approximate. The baseline is BAU including existing energy taxes levied for climate change in some Member States. Three policy scenarios are investigated: first, minimum energy tax rates corresponding approximately to the above mentioned EU Directive 2003/96/EC, second, a more climate friendly energy tax scheme that better reflects the carbon content of each energy product, and third, the EU minimum energy taxation when the Kyoto target is fulfilled by EU ETS and a domestic carbon tax. Tax revenues are directly recycled through a decrease of social security contributions. The introduction of minimum energy tax rates in the first scenario reduces CO 2 emissions by 0.5% vis-à-vis BAU. The induced price increase is very small. It is outweighed by the reduction in labour costs. Therefore, GDP does not change and welfare increase slightly by 0.01%. The loss on the export market of 0.02% is very small. In the case of the more climate friendly energy taxation CO 2 emissions are reduced by 2.7%. Both GDP and welfare increase slightly by 0.02%. The price increase reduces slightly the EU exports by 0.08%. The economic impacts remain rather small because the induced price increase is still small and the negative effects on domestic and foreign demand are partly compensated by lower labour costs. As the CO 2 constraint is stronger in the third policy scenario, the economic impacts become negative. GDP decreases by 0.09%, welfare by 0.5% and exports by 0.27%. The efficient design of the EU ETS and the tax revenue recycling strategy still allow avoiding high macroeconomic costs even in countries where the reduction compared to BAU emissions is high. It is also important to remember that in most countries the intra-EU exports represent more than 50% of total exports and this limits the negative effect on exports when a harmonised policy is implemented in the EU.
These results are confirmed by a more recent study based on the same CGE model (Kouvaritakis et al., 2005) which analyses the impacts of an energy tax scheme in the enlarged EU. 4 The baseline is BAU with minimum tax rates of the EU Directive or national tax rates (if they are higher) in the EU15. In the new Member States only the current tax rates apply, regardless of whether they are higher than the minimum tax rates or not. As before, three policy scenarios are considered: first, the introduction of the EU minimum energy tax rates in the new Member States, second, the EU-wide implementation of a more climate friendly tax, and third, the EU minimum energy taxation when the Kyoto target is fulfilled by EU ETS and a domestic carbon tax. The overall economic effects (GDP, welfare, exports) as well as the effects on CO 2 emissions are minor in the case of EU minimum energy taxation or the more climate friendly energy taxation. The impacts on the EU economy are negative if the Kyoto target is to be achieved. An efficient initial allocation of emission allowances and tax revenues recycling may limit these negative effects.
Policy Measures in the Transport Sector
The former section dealt with broad energy taxes which in part include tax rates on motor fuels. This section is devoted to simulation studies on environmental instruments applied explicitly to the transport sector. The Member States have implemented or discussed several policy measures in order to control emissions of transport activities, including road charges, fuel taxes, or fuel efficiency standards.
The National Level
The German government uses a combination of fuel taxation, voluntary commitment of the automotive industry and road charges for heavy goods vehicles in order to curb the emissions of the transport sector. The German environmental tax reform raised the existing tax rates on transport and heating fuels gradually over five years until 2003. Further increases did not take place due to political and public resistance. Distelkamp et al. (2004) analyse the macroeconomic effects if the tax rates on motor fuels had been further increased in annual steps until 2008 in order to foster emission reduction in the transport sector. For this purpose 4 For numerical results see table 2 in the conclusion.
they extend the macroeconometric model PANTA RHEI by a transport module. By 2020, the CO 2 emissions are almost 0.4% below the BAU level. The economic impacts of continuing the tax reform are small. The calculation for 2020 shows no significant change in GDP.
Employment increases slightly by 0.2% because the additional tax revenues are used to reduce non-wage labour costs. The shift of tax burden from labour to energy benefits in particular the labour intensive sectors (the Double Dividend effect).
Furthermore, the authors analyse the economic implications of a tax on kerosene in Germany.
They assume a Europe-wide introduction of a tax rate of 0.302 € per litre kerosene in 2005. for motor fuels in Europe. The remainder of Boeters et al. (2003) investigates the economic impacts of a tax on motor fuels. The fuel tax is endogenously determined in the model such that the CO 2 reduction equals the reduction under the efficiency standard. The tax decreases the welfare of the representative household by 0.23%. The macroeconomic costs are slightly smaller because the fuel tax reduces CO 2 emissions by increasing fuel efficiency and decreasing volume of traffic whereas the standard only increases fuel efficiency.
The European Level
Schade and Doll (2005) 
Policy Measures to Promote Renewable Energy Sources
According to the EU Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources, 22% of total electricity consumption of the EU15 is to be produced from renewables in 2010, compared to 14% in 1997. Taking into account the national targets of the ten new Member States, the collective objective of the EU25 amounts to 21%. The EU Directive does not specify any particular instruments in order to achieve the targets but rather leaves the responsibility for the implementation of appropriate measures with the Member
States. The analysis of the policies and measures currently in place in the EU15 indicates that they will probably achieve a share of only 18 -19% in 2010. Only Denmark, Germany, The dominating support system in the EU15 are feed-in tariffs which exist for instance in Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands. The second important support system are quota obligations associated with a system of tradable green certificates (TGC) which exist for instance in the U.K., Sweden or Italy. Feed-in tariffs are specific prices for green electricity, normally set for a fixed-term period, which electricity companies have to pay to producers of green electricity. The prices are typically differentiated by the type of renewables source, namely hydropower, wind, biomass, and solar. The additional costs of electricity generation due to a larger use of renewables are usually passed on to power consumers by premiums on end-user prices. In the case of a TGC system electricity consumers are required to purchase a certain share of green electricity, i.e. green certificates, according to their electricity consumption. Alternatively producers can be obliged to produce a certain share of green electricity according to their production. In order to exploit the cheapest possibilities consumers or producers are free to trade the green certificates. Thus, in addition to the power market there is a market for green certificates. The TGC scheme has, at least in theory, the advantage that a given share of green electricity can be generated at least costs, whereas a feed-in tariff system would require perfect information on marginal generation costs of all technologies. Feed-in tariffs instead allow for differentiated treatment of technologies, taking other objectives into account than just 'greening' of electricity, i.e. it allows for supporting long-term technologies which are not yet competitive.
The National Level
The German renewable energy source act ( 
The European Level
The studies of Uyterlinde et al. (2004 and One can observe increasing oil imports to Western Europe whereas gas and coal imports decrease. The GDP loss in Western Europe is not followed by a significant GDP change in neighbouring regions. Böhringer and Löschel (2006) simulate a 30% quota on renewable electricity production with the CGE model PACE. Here,the quota is also achieved through an endogenous uniform subsidy. The result is a relatively modest welfare loss for the EU15 ranging from 0.03% in 2010 to 0.08% in 2020.
Summary and Conclusion
Tables 1 Table 2 presents the macroeconomic effects of energy taxes on the national or the European level. The macroeconomic costs of policy measures that apply solely to the transport sector are shown in Table 3 . The analysis of these instruments shows that particularly revenue recycling and tax exemptions influence the cost burden. The use of revenues for reductions in (non-wage) labour costs benefits the labour intensive sectors and limits the negative effects on GDP and welfare. In some cases they may even create positive effects (Double Dividend).
Tax exemptions for energy intensive industries also reduce the macroeconomic costs because they disburden companies that otherwise would have been heavily affected. Obviously this comes at the costs of environmental effectiveness or reduces the regulatory efficiency because comparatively cheap abatement options in these sectors will be ignored. Table 4 shows the results for policy measures to promote renewable energy sources.
Regarding the economic effects of the promotion of renewables, it is often assumed that the promotion of renewables enhance employment and economic growth. The arguments are that renewable energy production is more labour intensive than conventional energy production and that renewable energy production requires less imported goods and services. Indeed, some studies find positive effects on GDP and employment in the short run. In the long run, however, higher generation costs often dominate the net effect. Due to a variety of assumptions in the models, the results in the four tables should be neither combined to assess total costs of environmental regulation 7 nor compared directly with each other. The model assumptions differ with regard to the BAU baseline, technological progress, time frame, the elasticity of domestic and foreign demand, and -last but not least -by the specific regulatory design.
Considering these results, we can conclude that the environmental regulation affects the European economy. The macroeconomic costs, however, appear to be relatively small. Most studies find losses clearly below 1%, some even indicate macroeconomic gains. 7 Such an assessment would have to consider furthermore the overlapping impacts of the policy measures. For discussion on overlapping instruments in European carbon emission regulation, see . 8 A recently published review on the economics of climate change (Stern 2006 ) -albeit disputed -concludes that reducing greenhouse gas emissions on a global level to "avoid the worst impacts of climate change" is possible at costs below 1% of global GDP per year.
